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This paper reports on a set of trust games with third party punishment (TPP) where 
participants are either family members or friends or unrelated villagers. The experimental 
sessions were carried out in southern Namibia (Karas) and the bordering northern South 
Africa (Namaqualand). The aim was to test several hypotheses derived from kin selection 
theory as well as to assess the importance of third party punishment for encounters among 
family members and friends. Building on Hamilton, (1964) it was proposed by e.g. Madsen et 
al., (2007) that kinship is the baseline behaviour among humans. Thus, I use kinship as basis 
for comparison of how we treat friends and unrelated people and when there is the possibility 
to punish free-riding behaviour. It turns out that kinship is the baseline behaviour when no 
other features are available to humans. However, a personal exchange among friends that has 
a third party observer performs better than a personal exchange among family members 
without third party punishment. Contributions to family members can substantially be 
increased by third party punishment. Thus, human ability to sustain a norm by punishing free-
riders at personal costs could also have played an important role in sustaining co-operation 
among kin. 
Keywords:  Trust, field experiment, third party punishment, kinship, friendship  2
1. Introduction 
There is strong uncontested evidence that the possibility to punish free-riders sustains norms 
of co-operation or fairness among humans even when the punisher has only personal costs 
from doing so (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003;Fehr and Gächter, 2002). But, is the possibility to 
sustain a norm still necessary when the involved persons are family members or friends? Will 
an unrelated third party still enforce a norm deviating behaviour when the personal exchange 
is between two related family members? Undoubtedly, humans behave more altruistic 
towards members of their own kin (Daly and Wilson, 1988; literature cited in Lieberman et 
al., 2008 or Madsen et al. 2007). Altruism
1 among kinship is explained by assuming selfish 
genes that aim at increasing the relative fitness within their own population through means of 
cooperation (Hamilton 1964; Dawkins, 1976). Strict Darwinian thinking does not allow 
altruistic genes to survive in a larger society with encounters of non-kin. However, everyday 
experience or anthropological research on food sharing tells us that humans also behave 
altruist with non-kin. The strongest rejection of the kin selection theory is the strong 
reciprocity hypotheses which builds on economic experiments that show that a large portion 
of individuals behave altruist even in one-shot encounters with unrelated anonymous people 
in large groups of people they will never meet again and thus where reputation is very limited 
(Fehr and Henrich, 2003). Strong reciprocity is “a combination of altruistic rewarding, which 
is a predisposition to reward others for cooperative, norm-abiding behaviours, and altruistic 
punishment, which is a propensity to impose sanctions on others for norm violations” (Fehr 
and Fischbacher 2003:785). The norm enforcing effect of third party punishment is 
unquestioned there is still a debate on the evolutionary origins of co-operation.  
 
Since altruism is costly to individuals and the benefits from altruism are shared among 
unrelated group members it is an evolutionary puzzle why humans co-operate even with 
unrelated strangers (Boyd et al., 2003). One possible explanation from evolutionary biology 
or evolutionary psychology is that genetic relatedness regulates pattern of altruistic behaviour 
and that kin selection produce the evolution of pro-social behaviour since individuals that 
help a genetic relative are favoured by natural selection and benefit from a higher 
reproduction rate of their genes. Thus, co-operation can have emerged from kin networks in 
the first human societies and stepwise included non relatives (Gardner and West, 2004) or 
might have led to “the big mistake hypothesis” that claims that the psychological mechanisms 
                                                 
1 According to Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) altruism is performing costly acts that confer benefits on 
others.   3
underlying pro-social behaviours are not adjusted enough to differentiate the experimental 
context to past situations where these mechanisms are adapted for (Johnson et al., 2002) or 
humans have an evolved system of detecting relatedness also found with primates and other 
species (Lieberman, 2007). Proponents of non-kin driven theories of the evolution of pro-
social behaviour question these transmission channels of altruistic behaviour into groups with 
unrelated strangers and instead believe that reciprocal altruism, reputation and especially 
strong reciprocity also called pro-social punishment or altruistic punishment have lead to the 
evolution of pro-social behaviour among humans. Strong reciprocity is an evolved feature that 
enables humans to enforce norms
2 that tell people what ought to be done in a certain situation 
when no explicit agreement exist e.g. in the family at the workplace in formal or informal 
associations in the use of common-pool resources, in the provision of public goods or for 
solving problems of collective action. In one-shot experiments with large groups of 
genetically unrelated and anonymous individuals a large proportion of individuals behaves as 
altruistic punishers or altruistic rewarder thereby sustaining a group beneficial norm of co-
operation although punishing is monetary costly for them and yields no future monetary gain
3 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Gintis et 
al., 2003). However, recent research on neuroeconomics has found that co-operating and 
punishing norm deviators stimulates reward related brain areas which might further explain 
the evolutionary origin of punishment (De Quervain et al., 2004; McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling 
et al., 2002). So far the hypotheses from both theories have only been tested isolated. In a 
recent article, Madsen et al. (2007) experimentally test altruism among kin and proposes that 
“kinship represents a baseline against which humans make judgements that may subsequently 
be coloured by issues of reciprocity, obligation prosociality and other ethical considerations” 
(ibid p.355). Madsen et al. (2007) criticise the microeconomic experiments in small scale 
societies or in the laboratory for the deliberate omission of kinship as well as psychological 
surveys that mainly use hypothetical experiments without real incentives. The presented 
experiment addresses the main critique of Madsen et al. (2007) and uses microeconomic 
experiments that account for kinship as explanatory variable and participants to the 
experiment are not asked to allocate hypothetical amounts to family members. A next step in 
                                                 
2 According to Ostrom, (2000), norms are shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, 
permitted, or forbidden. Fehr and Gächter, (2000) define a norm as a behavioural regularity that is 
based on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave; which triggers the enforcement of the 
prescribed behaviour by informal social sanctions.  
3 In principle, the sanctions in the finitely repeated public goods game with a stable group composition 
could be driven by self-interest because punished group members typically increase their contributions 
in future periods thus yielding a higher gain for the punishers as well.   4
dealing with these two conflicting evolutionary views on co-operation could be to design 
experiments that account both for kinship and for third party punishment. The presented 
experiment is the first experiment that tests for the relative strength of kinship compared to 
third party punishment in personal exchange. It tests the kinship and TPP effect for 
trust/altruism and a distribution norm. I use a simple dyadic trust game with a third party 
punishment opportunity and analyse trust/altruism (Player 1), fair distribution (Player 2) and 
punishing behaviour of a third party (Player 3) when the violation of a norm occurs between 
two family members, two friends or two unrelated villagers. Although, trust is to a large 
degree calculative and influenced by the expectation of trustworthiness (Barr, 2003) it was 
found, that the trust exhibited by the first player in a trust games to a large degree refers to 
altruism as mainly amount sent in a trust game are not very different from contributions in a 
dictator game that measures altruism (Cox, 2003). Also, on average first players do not win 
from trusting their counterpart which cast doubt on the rationality of players or the calculative 
self-interest explanation of trust (Camerer, 2003). Hence, first player’s choice does to some 
degree also include altruism. Second player in the trust game is also in a dictator game like 
situation where he can decide on the distribution of the money. However, second player’s 
choice does not necessary measure altruism as it was found that the intention of player one 
whether he sends or not clearly influences behaviour of player two (McCabe et al., 2003). 
Therefore, I test for Hamilton’s rule of altruism by building an aggregate measure of 
relatedness (r) for all family members. The higher the aggregate value of r the more altruistic 
the person should behave towards player two. Besides replicating the results obtained by 
Madsen et al. (2007) in a different setting I further analyse the relationship between TPP, 
friendship and kinship as well as the relative strengths of their effects.   
 
2. Related Literature  
2.1. Kinship and friendship 
Trust games played in the field have by now been carried out extensively and the variance of 
the obtained results is rather low
4. However none of the studies were framed to investigate 
friendship or family ties. A field experiment carried out in resettled communities in 
Zimbabwe indirectly analysed the effect of kinship on behaviour in a trust game experiment 
(Barr, 2004). Barr (2004) found that in resettled communities with fewer kinship relations 
                                                 
4 Amount sent by Player 1 range between 40 and 60 per cent of the initial endowment. Player 2 
usually returns the same amount Player 1 sent initially.    5
trust was lower but that there was no difference in the trustworthiness. Participants in her trust 
did not know whether they were paired with a kin or a friend or an unrelated villager. 
However, participants might have realized the higher likelihood of being paired with someone 
of their own family in a traditional village as compared to a resettled community. Peters et al., 
(2004) first published an experiment using groups of family members. They found in a 
laboratory experiment on voluntary contribution mechanism that parents and children 
contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups 
with strangers. Their sample consisted of a mix of parents and children, often with only one 
parent present in groups of three or four and they played three subsequent sessions either 
family-stranger-family or stranger-family-stranger. However, since the recruitment required 
parents and children to register beforehand the family had to discuss amongst them whether 
they would like to participate or not. Thus, there might have been some pre-experimental 
arrangement as family members had a chance to talk to each other before the game, an 
induced behaviour that participants had to think about family and knew they were tested as a 
family, or that the family in reality formed a group solidarity often reported in experiments 
with known group identity
5. Also, a self-selection bias of families and family members who 
have good relations with each other might arise. Many of these shortcomings have been dealt 
with in the study of Haan et al., (2006) who investigate friendship in a similar public good 
setting as Peters et al. (2004). Haan et al. (2006) use a non computerized classroom 
experiment in a high school where the researchers deliberately formed groups of friends and 
normal classmates based on their prior knowledge and observation of friendship in the 
classes. They find that friendship dramatically affects individuals’ contributions to public 
goods and even increases in the last rounds where one would expect much lower 
contributions. Participants to Madsen et al. (2007) experiments had to perform a painful task 
where the individual pain was increasing with time invested in the task and the more time was 
spent in the experiment the more money was transferred to either a close or more distant 
relative of the participant. Thus, altruist had to bear severe costs and people behaved more 
altruistic towards a close relative than a distant relative. Madsen et al. (2007) claim to provide 
the first experimental evidence for altruism based on Hamilton’s rule and where all other 
possible influencing factors such as reciprocity could be excluded from the design. Over and 
above their experiment was carried out in England as well as in a Zulu community in South 
Africa where kinship relations are very different.  
 
                                                 
5 See for example Güth et al., (2006).   6
But how does altruism based on kinship work in large groups of unrelated strangers? 
According to Sánchez and Cuesta, (2005), Lieberman et al. (2007) or Park and Schaller 
(2007) humans have an evolved system of detecting relatedness also found with primates or 
other species
6. Park and Schaller (2007) found evidence that attitude similarity can serve as 
heuristic for signalling kinship. Sherman et al., (1997) argue that phenotype matching a form 
of facial self-resemblance serves as a mean to determine a certain action. Based on their 
theory DeBruine, (2002) found that facial self-resemblance increases trust in a trust 
experiment and Krupp et al., (2008) found that contributions in a public good game increased 
as a function of facial self-resemblance. The critique of evolutionary economists and 
anthropologists concerning the kin selection theory is twofold. Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) 
write on the evolutionary origins of the nature of human altruism that the role of kinship 
(universalistic altruism) or friendship (particularistic altruism) in human altruism is not 
discussed because it is well-known that humans share kin-driven altruism. However, they 
question the evolutionary significance of kinship (as well as of reputation and reciprocity) 
since altruism is exhibited in large groups of unrelated strangers in anonymous one-shot 
situations. Henrich, (2004) argues that in prehistoric societies as well as in small-scale 
societies today people behave altruist with plenty of unrelated and distant relatives although 
everywhere in the world people can and do distinguish between kin and non-kin 
behaviourally. The alternative approach by evolutionary economists is strong reciprocity 
which is based on the evidence obtained from third party punishment experiments. 
 
2.2. Third party punishment  
In public goods experiments participants usually stop co-operating and get angry when other 
participants contribute less than oneself to the public good since lowering one’s own 
contribution is the only possibility to retaliate against free-riders. When participants have the 
possibility to punish non-contributors, they do so at a cost to themselves (see cf. Dawes et al., 
1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Yamagishi, 1992). Divergent to an involved player who has an 
own personal incentive to punish norm deviators the article by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) 
studies how an uninvolved third party punishes norm deviating behaviour at own personal 
cost. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) compare co-operation levels between third party 
punishment to second party punishment in two different experiments as well as the pattern 
                                                 
6 Lieberman et al. (2007) use survey instruments to first construct the kinship index based on maternal 
perinatal association (MPA) and coresidence and then ask four different instruments related to sexual 
aversion to kin as well as kin altruism. They find evidence that humans direct altruism and sexual 
aversion to kin according to their kinship estimator.     7
and strength of third party punishment. The first experiment analysed by Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004) is the dictator game which tests violations of a distribution norm and the 
second experiment used a prisoner’s dilemma game to test violations of the cooperation norm. 
In both cases up to 60 % of third parties punished norm deviators and thus contributed to the 
formation and sustenance of social norms in the groups. Bernhard et al.,   
(2006) is the only field experiment that used a third party punishment mechanism. They 
studied the punishing behaviour combined with a dictator game among two different tribes in 
Papua New Guinea and related punishments to in-group altruism or to out-group altruism. 
They found that third parties are more willing to punish dictators who violate the norms for 
sharing when the recipient is an in-group member (irrespective of the whether the dictator is 
an in- or out-group member). Also, transfers were higher when dictator and recipient were 
members of the same tribe but they also find altruism among different groups. An experiment 
with a similar aim and result has been carried out by Lieberman (2007) who finds that third 
parties punish someone who targets their own kin more severe than strangers and that in-
group members are punished less severe. See also Goette et al., (2006) for a natural field 
experiment in the Swiss Army where fellow platoon members were more willing to enforce a 
norm of cooperation amongst them but without being hostile to out-group members. Lastly, to 
my knowledge only Charness et al., (2006) used a trust game in combination with a third 
party punishment mechanism. With third party punishment trust increases by 60% and also 
trustworthiness is significant but modestly increased by third party punishment.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
In contrast to psychological experiments, economists adhere to an experimental method that 
uses repeated play, no deception, and most importantly monetary incentives
7 and anonymous 
interactions. That players need to be anonymous to each other in economic experiments has 
been one of the reasons for not yet using experimental methods to study behaviour among kin 
and friends. When both players have full information with whom they are paired with in an 
experimental session the results might rather relate to expected post-game punishments from 
the other person than experimental design
8. It seems not very instructive to ask undergraduate 
                                                 
7 Another point criticized by Madsen et al. 2007 is that participants in the third party punishment and 
other games do not pay a personal cost since the player leaves the experiment with more money as 
when he arrived. 
8 Glaeser et al., (1999) conducted a trust game and prior to playing, they introduced the pairs of 
players and then asked how well and by what means they knew each other. They found that the level 
of investment by trusters increased with the degree of social connection between the players and 
argued that this was because of greater opportunities for post-play punishment.   8
students to bring along some of their family members to the next experimental session. So far, 
behaviour among kin has mainly been studied with field observation by anthropologists. 
However, in small scale societies or in rural villages like in southern Namibia and the 
Namaqualand of South Africa kinship ties are very prominent and the likelihood of having 
members of one’s own kin in a pool of 30 randomly picked people is quite high. To explore 
the effect of kinship I ran nine sessions of a trust game with and without third party 
punishment in nine different villages and let participants prior to the game write on a form 
more than one and up to five members of their family and more than one and up to five 
friends that were also taking part in the same experimental session. When participants were 
making their decisions they were asked to state how they play the game for each possible 
category (family, friendship, unrelated). Since the matching of players was drawn randomly 
participants were informed that they could be paired with either one of their family member, 
friends or an unrelated villager. However, they could not know for sure with whom they were 
paired as people had to name at least two people for each category. Thus, the decision 
regarding kinship was not hypothetical but involved real money and the experiment was still 
anonymous as no one knew the composition of his pair.  
 
I use the strategy method without immediate cash involved and a simple dyadic trust game. 
According to Solnick, (2007) the influence of different methods in a trust game was 
negligible. In the strategy method, subjects state contingent choices for every decision node 
they may face; then subjects are matched randomly; and, finally, the appropriate choices are 
carried out for the nodes that are reached, and the other contingent choices are ignored. 
Sequential games are those in which players make moves at different times or in turn. In this 
sequential-move trust game (Figure xx) the first player can decide to take a certain outcome 
[10,10]  for both players by choosing “R” or he can choose “D” and let the second player 
determine the actual outcome. The second player can choose between “d” the symmetric joint 
maximum outcome [20,20] or “r” the defection outcome [5,30] where player two gets 30 
ZAR and player one only 5 ZAR. In the non-strategy method players who move later in the 
game have full information about the actions of other players. Thus, Player 2 knows whether 
Player 1 played “D” or “R”. In the experiment I applied the strategy method asking Player 2 
what he would do if Player 1 decided to play “D”. Thus while the first player has to look 
ahead to act now the second player is confronted with the question given that the first player 
played “D” what will I do? He has a moral decision whether to repay trust or not. In Figure xx   9
playing “D” by the first player is commonly referred to trust but also altruism or risk, while 
“d” measures second player’s trustworthiness or fairness.  
 
 
Figure 1 Decision tree used in the experiment. 
 
In the scenario with third party punishment Player 3 receives 20 ZAR. Player 3 can keep his 
endowment or use his money to subtract money from Player 1 if she is playing “R” or from 
Player 2 if she is playing “r”. For every ZAR invested 5 ZAR are subtracted from the other 
player. Thus, if Player 3 wishes to punish Player 2 with 4 ZAR Player 2 receives 10 ZAR at 
the end of the game and Player 3 receives 16 ZAR. However, dissimilar to other studies I did 
not test whether a family member would punish his own family more or less severe but 
whether an uninvolved person would punish a norm deviating behaviour between two family 
members (not necessarily his own family), two friends (not necessarily his own friends) or 
two unrelated villagers as in small rural villages most encounters take place among family 
members and friends. 
 
3.1. Predictions  
The above mentioned theories lead to the following nine predictions that I can experimentally 
test to see which of the theories best organizes the data. The predictions in the baseline 
scenario follow from the individual profit maximizing strategy 
(i)  Dominance or Backward induction: Since the defection outcome strictly 






R Player 1: 10 ZAR 
Player 2: 10 ZAR 
Player 1:   5 ZAR 
Player 2: 30 ZAR 
Player 1: 20 ZAR 
Player 2: 20 ZAR   10
therefore he will choose also to defect. Thus, by applying backward reasoning one 
finds the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game as [10,10]. This is the outside 
option of Player 1.  
 
(ii)  Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies: Besides the Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies there exists a second Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy. A mixed 
strategy is a probability distribution over the pure strategies that might be played. 
With a probability of 1 Player 1 will play R and Player 2 will play r with a 
probability of 2/3 and d with a probability of 1/3. The second Nash equilibrium is 
not a subgame perfect equilibrium. This is because it violates the rules of 
backward induction, which hold that Player 1 would never choose D. 
 
 
Thus, Player 1 should not cooperate according to the theoretical predictions. However, since 
Player 1 does not know with whom in the population she is paired and assuming there are 
different types of players it can be rational for Player 1 to play “D”. For example if Player 1 
expects a high number of co-operators in the experiment he could expect player 2 to play “d” 
and thus also play “D”. Although the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect 
it makes sense in a situation where people are not fully anonymous but come from the same 
little village and share the same experiences and maybe have same expectations about the 
likelihood of co-operation. Introducing a third party punishment opportunity adds another 
uncertainty to players’ strategies. Not only do they build believes about their anonymous 
partners likelihood of co-operation but also how this is influenced by a third party that could 
punish at own costs.  
(iii)  If player 1 and player 2 assume player 3 to be payoff maximizing both player 1 
and player 2 should not change their behaviour and continue to play the dominant 
strategy R,r.  
 
The following hypotheses are derived from kin selection theory: 
(iv)  For trust and fairness among family members to be the baseline behaviour, family 
members should be treated with more trust and fairness than unrelated villagers.  
 
(v)  Friends should be treated as unrelated villagers according to both kin selection 
theory and game theory. However, social capital literature argues that with   11
increasing network size and network strength co-operation will increase. Also the 
psychological literature suggests that close friendship activates processes similar 
to kinship and this might be especially true for women.  
 
(vi)  It follows from prediction (iii) and (v) that if TPP and friendship have no effect on 
trust and fairness the combined effect of friendship and TPP or villager and TPP 
should also be insignificant to the baseline family treatment. 
 
(vii)  For trust and fairness among family members to be the baseline behaviour, third 
party punishment should have (if at all) the smallest effect between family 
members. Since family members already behave more altruist than friends or 
villagers the expected change in behaviour should be smallest between family 
members. 
 
(viii)  According to kin selection theory by Hamilton (1964) a gene for altruism can 
evolve if 
rB > C 
where B is benefit of the recipient and C the cost of the altruist and r the 
coefficient of relationship (r = 0.5 for sibling or parent; r = 0.25 for grandparent, 
aunt, uncle, niece or nephew and r = 0.125 for cousins). Thus, participants with 
higher r should be more altruistic when playing with their family. This hypotheses 
is tested both for Player one and two since both actions have elements of altruism. 
 
(ix)  Reciprocity is less important among kin than among nonkin. Playing cooperatively 
as player one although expecting player two to behave selfish should be higher for 
family than for friends and unrelated villagers. Similarly, the correlation between 
first player playing D and expectation that player 2 will play d should be higher for 
friends and villagers.  
 
3.2. Experimental Implementation 
The experiments were carried out in two different regions that were during apartheid regime 
either a former homelands or so called “coloured reserves” where the non-white population 
lived: The Namaland in the Karas Region of southern Namibia where altogether 1235 
households or roughly 5800 people live (Republic of Namibia, 2001). The Namaqualand in   12
South Africa at the border to the Namibian Karas region consising of approximately 30000 
people living in six former “rural reserves” or “coloured reserves” of Richtersveld, Steinkopf, 
Concordia, Komaggas, Pella, and Leliefontein (Figure 1). The trust games were played in 4 
villages of the former Leliefontein reserve of the Kamiesberg municipality and in two villages 
of the Steinkopf area. A detailed statistics of the villages is presented in table xx. Especially in 
Namibia the experiment was mainly played with a younger population that have lower 
income but higher education.   
 
Living in rural communities implies a high interdependence and the need of working together 
with other villagers. People therefore depend on others in various ways to accomplish their 
personal and organizational goals. In many similar societies, rights to use natural resources 
like fishing, grazing or forestry are held by communities, kinship groups, or individuals under 
a multiplicity of property-rights regimes. Where control and rules are not easily enforceable 
this interdependence and the resulting need for cooperation is solved (or not) through trust 
and evolved norms. But Nooteboom, (2002:195) notes that “Often, trust based on friendship 
or kinship will not suffice as a basis for cooperation. It may not be sufficiently robust under 
extremes of temptation.” Rohde et al., (2003) analyse the kinship ties in a small community of 
the research area in the Namaqualand. According to them relations of exchange are based on 
spatial patterns which are dominated by kinship and bonds between neighbours. The 
livelihood of the poorest depends strongly on the benevolence they get from these social 
networks. Altruism directed to members of the same kin thus is a widely practiced behaviour 
in the study region “through which individuals and families are able to withstand shocks and 
help each other expand limited livelihood opportunities” (ibid 38).  
   13
 
Figure 2 Communal areas in Namibia and South Africa. communal area of Berseba and Tses lies within 
the Karas district of Namibia. The communal area of Leliefontein is part of the Kamiesberg municipality 
within the Northern Cape Province. 
 
 
The difficulty of the design was to determine people’s kinship ties and friends. Asking people 
to identify their family and friends has two shortcomings according to Haan (2004): People 
think about family and friendship before the experiment which might already affect their 
behaviour in the experiment. Also, such questions are likely to yield socially acceptable 
answers, for example by inducing them to identify many more friends than they actually have. 
Regarding the first difficulty the participants were not confronted with family and friendship 
prior to the experiment only within the experiment, which is also exactly what people, should 
do when making their decisions
9. The more severe second difficulty was handled by limiting 
the available friends with whom they might be paired to five friends. On average people 
reported to have 4,52 friends in the session and 2,51 family members. However, I use the total 
amount of friends people reported to have in the session as a control variable.  
 
                                                 
9 Only a short welcome note (without saying, that they could earn some money) was read out before 
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The procedure of the experiment was the following. Participants were invited and recruited 
through various channels. Participants needed to be above 18 years of age. The invitation to 
participate was spread both through written notices at the local shops as well as through 
mouth to mouth propaganda. The experiments were played in community buildings of the 
municipality or at a similar place. The experiments were all pretested and run in Afrikaans. 
Upon arrival participants received a sheet to identify their friends and family members. When 
handing the finished form in players drew their player number (consisting of a number 
between 1 and 100 and a letter A, B, C) out of an opaque bag. Then the experimental 
instructions were read aloud to all participants and visualized on a (white) board by the same 
native speaker in all villages. Participants also received written instructions and had to answer 
a set of questions on the experiment. Thereafter, the participants were sent in a separate room 
one-by-one to. In the room the researcher first checked the answers to the quiz and made sure 
the participant understood all possible outcomes in the game. Than the participant was asked 
to make his decision according to his role and assuming he would be paired with either one of 
his family members [friends, other villager not identified on his sheet] that also did take part 
in the experiment and also what he expected the other persons to do. Participants were paid 
after the final round of the experiment according to a random matching of players and 
whether they were paired with one of their friends, family or not. 
   15 
Village Size  Country  Treatment N  Earnings  Quiz 
% 










Kharkams 1291  RSA  TPP  26  15,88  75  7,31  38,5 50  80  50  4,92  1,46  ,245 
Tweerivier 207  RSA TPP  28  14,04 82  9,62  29,2 61  98  60  4,93  4,00  ,235 
Soebatsfontein 246 RSA  TPP  24  17,21  89 8,32  36,4 67 83  37  4,38  3,17  ,242 
Spoegrivier 460  RSA  TPP  27  19,07  96  7,96  39,4 70 90  52  4,37  2,33 ,225 
Bulletrap 357  RSA  No  22  13,41  79  8,33  33,3 36  97  56  4,91 2,45  ,256 
Steinkopf 7256  RSA  No  19  10,00  90  9,78  40,5 53  62  34  4,84 1,32  ,146 
Tses 904  Namibia  TPP  27  14,56  91  9,63  30,2 41  65  20  4,04  2,11  ,279 
Keetmanshoop 15000 Namibia TPP  22  17,27  96  10,7  23,5 55  30  13  3,36  1,59  ,130 
Berseba 535  Namibia  TPP 21  15,67  98  10,5 27,7 90  55 26 4,95  3,95  ,202 
Average 2917      24  15,37  89  9,13 33,3 58  75 40 4,52 2,51  0,227 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics from the experimental sample 
 
 
 Role  Villager  Family  Friends 
Baseline   A  2 sessions (n= 21)  2 sessions (n= 14)  2 sessions (n= 21) 
Baseline   B  2 sessions (n= 19)  2 sessions (n= 13)  2 sessions (n= 19) 
TPP  A  7 sessions (n= 57)  7 sessions (n= 41)  7 sessions (n= 51) 
TPP  B  7 sessions (n= 55)  7 sessions (n= 38)  7 sessions (n= 54) 
TPP  C  7 sessions (n= 60)  7 sessions (n= 60)  7 sessions (n= 60) 
Table 2 Design for within and between subject study. All participants played either TPP or baseline without TPP treatment with a villager and according to availability 
also with family and/or friends.    16
4. Results 
This experiment is also a follow-up experiment to a trust game using the money method 
played in the Namaqualand of South Africa and southern Namibia where participants 
exhibited unexpected low levels of trust sending only 27% of their endowment, 40% of 
people sending nothing at all and 25% sending half or more of their endowment of their 8 
ZAR. Also, the return ratio with 0,71 was quite low in the initial experiment. Of those who 
obtained a positive amount from player one only 55% returned at least something 45% 
returned the same amount they received and 14% had a return ratio equal or greater than 1.5 
meaning that they evenly distributed the money among themselves. I argue elsewhere 
(Vollan, forthcoming) that the reason for this unusual behaviour has to do with weak local 
institutions undermining trust, past external interventions, as well as heuristics that activate 
cultural norms among the Nama. The new experiment using the strategy method replicates the 
first trust game results quite well. In the baseline treatment without third party punishment 
and no family and friendship connection only 29% of people choose the trusting option “D” 




4.1. Kinship and third party punishment 
Concerning predictions (i) and (ii) the results are quite common indicating that people do not 
adhere to game theoretical predictions but a substantial portion of players applies norms of 
equal sharing or has an inequity aversion (Figure 3 left). Also, game theoretical prediction 
(iii) does not hold. Introducing TPP option increases trust and fairness to the baseline 
scenario. A test of between subjects study including all choices regardless whether it was 
among family friends or villagers reveals a significant effect of the TPP-treatment for trust 
(n=226; Z = -3.4; p<.01) and fairness (n=198; Z = -2.1; p<.05). However, an isolated view 
between subjects who played in TPP with a villager and subjects who played in baseline with 
a villager reveals that the increase in fairness due to TPP is not significant (Z = -.79; p=.5) 
only the change in trust (Z = -1.9; p<.1) is weak significant (Figure 3; right). Between 
subjects who played TPP with their friends and subjects who played baseline with their 
friends there is a significant change in trust (Z = -1.8; p<.1) and fairness (Z = -1.8; p<.1). 
                                                 
10 By only allowing a binary choice in the strategy method the frequency of “D” correlates strongly with 
the average amount sent and those players who sent or returned 50% of their money. By only offering 
a binary choice the option “d” is used less often than people would send at the same amount back but 
more often than equal sharing in the money method.    17
However, between subjects who played TPP with their family member and subjects who 
played baseline with their family member there is no significant increase in trust (Z = -1.0; 
p=.31) or fairness (Z = -1.1; p=.28) due to the TPP treatment. At least the reported 
significances between subjects for family should be treated carefully due to few people 
assigned in the baseline scenario (n=13 respectively n=14)
11. However, one can say that the 
effect of TPP is higher for trust than fairness and highest among friends. 
 
Prediction (iv) and (v) can be analysed with a within subject design testing whether 
individuals discriminating for family or friendship increases trust and fairness significant 
(Figure 4). A within subject comparison shows that people exhibit significantly more trust 
with their family members (or friends) (Z = -2.9; p<.01) (Z = -3.9; p<.01) and more fairness 
with their family members (or friends) (Z = -2.2; p<.05) (Z = -3.7; p<.01) than with another 
villager. Thus, prediction (iv) is satisfied for the total sample. Differentiating between the TPP 
and baseline treatment in the within subject design one obtains the frequencies displayed in 
figure 4 and 5 as well as its statistical significance reported in table xx. First players exhibit 
statistically more trust when playing with a family member than with a unrelated villager both 
in the baseline as well as in the TPP treatment. Second players’ fairness towards family 
members is only significantly higher in the baseline scenario. Prediction (iv) holds for the first 
player in both treatments.  
 
Prediction (v) tests the differences between family members and friendship. By looking at the 
frequencies in figure 4 and 5 one can see that more people treat their family members with 
trust and fairness than people treat their friends with trust and fairness. In the baseline 
treatment both trust (64% > 52%) and fairness (46% > 37%) are played more often among 
family members than among friends and in the TPP treatment trust (78% > 75%) and fairness 
(63% > 61%) are both played more often with family members than with friends. Thus, also 
the difference of family to friends is narrowing due to the TPP prediction (v) seems satisfied. 
However, none of the differences between family friends are significant. Participants do not 
treat family members different to their friends in terms of trust and fairness both in the 
baseline and in the TPP scenario (see table xx). There are also no differences between family 
                                                 
11 For interpretation of significance one should bear in mind that: Since the results match the first 
experiment quite well and recruiting was very difficult, there was fewer sessions played with the 
baseline treatment than the TPP. There were also less people who reported to have family members 
than friends in each session. The lower cases for family and no TPP however, aggravate the 
requirements for statistical significance for between subjects testing. Thus, although absolute numbers 
might be higher than with friendship they are not statistical significant.   18
and friendship for trust (Z = -.57; p=.5) and fairness (Z = -.24; p=.8) in the total sample. Thus, 
one cannot reject the hypothesis that people treat their friends different than their family 
members. There are also no gender specific effects for first players (Z = -.54; p=.6) and 
second players (Z = -.76; p=.5) that female participants treat their friends more like family 
members than men. 
 
Prediction (vi) looks whether family members are treated with more trust and fairness in the 
baseline scenario than villagers or friends with TPP. The frequency of playing trustful with a 
villager in the TPP treatment is lower (53%) than playing with a family member in the 
baseline treatment (64%). Similarly, the frequency of playing fair with a villager in the TPP 
treatment is lower (36%) than playing with a family member in the baseline treatment (46%).  
However, in the between subject design kinship effects are not statistically higher than the 
combined effects of villager and TPP for the first player (Z = -.78; p=.4) and the second 
player (Z = -.64; p=.5). Unlike, the villagers TPP treatment, the combined effects of 
friendship and TPP is higher for the first player (75% > 64%) and the second player (61% > 
46%). These effects are however for the first player (Z = -.75; p=.5) and the second player (Z 
= -.97; p=.3) not statistical significant.  
 
Prediction (vii) asks whether the effect of third party punishments is lowest for family 
members. For the second player the increase in percentages is highest among friends (39%) 
followed by villagers (27%) and indeed family members (26%). This difference becomes 
much greater by looking at the change of player one. Here, villagers increase their 
contribution due to TPP by 45 %, friends by 31 % and family members by only 18 %. Thus 
prediction (vii) holds. Furthermore, it is interesting to see that the increase in trust by villagers 
due to TPP is not accompanied by equally high increases in trustworthiness. It might be that 
due to the low expectations and unusual custom of being punished in the rural communities of 
Namibia and South Africa no stable expectations concerning punishment could be build. 
 
Prediction (viii) is a direct test of Hamilton’s rule. Since I use a within-subject design that 
automatically controls for individual socio-demographic differences in the treatments I simply 
uses the correlation coefficient of Pearson and find that player A is significantly playing more 
trustful when his family members have a higher average relatedness factor r (Pearson= .227; 
p<.1) or a higher total relatedness factor of Hamilton’s r (Pearson = .271; p<.05). Similar as 
prediction (iv) and (vii) prediction (viii) also only holds for the first player. The effect for the   19
second player who applies the fairness norm is not related to Hamilton’s relatedness 
coefficient. Average r is (Pearson = .062; p=.6) and total r (Pearson = .046; p=.7). Hamilton’s 
rule is defined for altruism and a trust game is said to measure trust with the first player and 
fairness for the second player. However, in the past, researchers have argued that the amount 
sent by the first player in a trust game to a large degree includes altruistic motives. When 
asked after the experiment very few first players expected to increase their stake by sending 
an amount to player two
12. In the first trust game played in the same study area only by 19 % 
of the first players who sent a positive amount to player two did that for calculative reason of 
trust (Vollan, forthcoming). Also, (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2006) find that religious 
believes and altruistic motives helping seem to activate trust much more than do calculative 
aspects. Usually, experiments that aim at measuring altruism use the dictator game where the 
first player receives 100 monetary token and can keep them or send any amount to the second 
player who has no choice but accepting the offer. Thus, in contrast to the first player in the 
trust game the first player in the dictator game will not get anything returned and thus does 
not expect anything in return. Cox (2003), for example, finds that dictators sent between 61 
and 97 percent of the amounts transferred by equally endowed trust-game players. If the 
design does not grant perfect anonymity and subjects know that their counterparts are drawn 
from the same village it could be that altruist motives play a much larger role in a trust game 
than do reciprocal motives. Also, Barr (2003) finds that the first player increases his 
contribution in traditional villages with higher family concentration whereas the trustee does 
not send more money back in these villages. Thus, it seems not too surprising to see that only 
the first mover choice in the family treatment follows Hamilton’s rule for altruism. The 
reason is that field experiments on trust do measure altruism instead of calculative trust. The 
motives of the second player do at least in the two trust games played in the study area not 
refer to altruism.  
 
                                                 
12 Brülhart and Usunier, (2004) Not only do people not expect any returns, they are also right in not 
expecting any returns. Camerer (2003, p. 87) summarizes his review on trust games that: “The fact 
that the return to trust is around zero seems fairly robust.”   20
 
 
Figure 3 Frequencies of strategies played the trust game with a villager without (left) and with (right) 




Figure 4 Frequencies of strategies played the trust game with a friend (left) or a family member (right) 
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Figure 5 Frequencies of strategies played the trust game with a friend (left) or a family member (right) 
and with punishment option. 
 
  Player A  Player B 
Treatment village-family  village-friend  friend-family village-family  village-friend  friend-family 
Baseline   -2.000* -2.236*  -1.000 -1.000 -1.000  -.577 
TPP     -2.324* -3.207**  .000  -2.000* -3.742**  -.535 
Table 3 Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for paired sample (Z-value and sig.level). 
 
 
From observation of family members and the psychological literature we would expect 
prediction (ix) that actions among family members will be less based on calculative self-
interest and more on altruistic giving without expecting any returns. For example we expect 
that a father does help his daughter without expecting that the daughter will return a similar 
favour to the father. People’s expectation of trust and trustworthiness among friends, family 
members and villagers were also asked during the experiment. But, is expectation of 
reciprocity higher that a family member or a friend will be trustworthy? And does the 
expected reciprocity lead to a change in behaviour. A correlation between what Player one did 
and what he expected player two to do should be highly correlating with each other if one 
expects player one to be rational. The Spearman correlation coefficient is highest among 
friends (Spearman = .79, p<.01) than villagers (Spearman = .61, p<.01) and family members 
(Spearman = .60, p<.01). In the baseline scenario which has no reinforcing expectations 
through punishment and thus uncertainty is higher there is a huge difference between the 
coefficient for friends (Spearman = .83, p<.01), villagers (Spearman = .88, p<.01) and family 
members (Spearman = .44, p=.11). Thus without other treatment the expectation of player one 
that player two would play fair had no significant impact on his behaviour. In 50% of the 
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played “D”. In the village scenario 24% of first players expected player two to be fair and 
only 29% of the first players played “D”. Thus, the results are not surprising in the light of 
prediction (viii) of Hamilton’s rule of altruism. Trust among unrelated people corresponds to 
expected trustworthiness (Barr 2003). Also Nooteboom (2002:48) uses a definition of trust 
that is based on expectations of trustworthiness. For him “‘Real’ trust is an expectation that 
things or people will not fail us […] even if there are perceived opportunities and incentives 
for it”. The role of expectations for trust is declining when playing with a family member as a 
fraction of first players seem to behave altruistic without necessarily expecting reciprocity.  
 
4.2. Third party punishing behaviour  
In the TPP treatment player who were assigned role C were endowed with 20 ZAR and could 
use any amount of their money to punish Player A when he was not trusting respectively 
Player B when he was not equally sharing the money
13. For one ZAR invested into 
punishment the punished player got 5 ZAR subtracted. Since I used the strategy method 
player C was asked how he would punish a transaction between two friends, two family 
members and two unrelated villagers. Figure xx and xx show the amount invested by the third 
party player when punishing player one and player two. Deviations from the fairness norm 
were punished more often and more severe than when player one was not exhibiting trust. On 
average player C punished deviations from a fairness norm between two friends [family; 
villager] with 1,2 ZAR [0,87 ZAR; 0,77 ZAR] and with a frequency of 53 % of all cases [45 
%; 38 %]. A non-trusting behaviour between two friends [family; villager] was punished on 
average with 0,38 ZAR [0,3 ZAR; 0,13 ZAR] and with a frequency of 24 % [20 %; 10 %]. 
The effects that third party punishers punished encounters between friends more often is 
significant for the fairness norm when compared with family members (Z = -3.03; p<.01) and 
a villager (Z = -3.25; p<.01). The difference between family members and villagers is not 
significant (Z = -.53; p=.59). However, punishing non altruist or non trusting acts there are no 
difference between friends and family members (Z = -1.23; p=.2). Thus, altruistic behaviour 
is as much punished between family members as among friends but adhering to the fairness 
norm of equally sharing is much more frequent punished among friends than family members. 
Deviating from the norm of altruism is significantly stronger enforced among friends than 
among villagers (Z = -3.21; p<.01) and also between family members compared to villagers 
(Z = -2.35; p<.05). However, compared with the laboratory setting of Fehr and Fischbacher 
                                                 
13 I deliberately omitted the possibility of antisocial punishment. However, see Herrmann et al., (2008) 
for recent evidence on the existence of antisocial punishment.    23
(2004) where 60 % of third parties punished norm deviating behaviour and Bernhard et al. 
(2006) where 58 % of third parties punished norm deviating behaviour if the dictator 
transferred nothing, enforcement of third parties in this study much less frequent. This could 
be due to peculiarities of the studied population or the difference between a trust and the 
dictator game.  
 
The motivation for the chosen punishment design was to test whether people would feel it 
more inappropriate to deviate from a norm if the two players do not know each other or 
between two people who know each other. The punisher could find it either more necessary to 
enforce a norm within the village or between two family members or two friends who are not 
his own family members or friends. From the data and the reaction of players, people tended 
to punish other strongest when they were friends and when they deviated from the fairness 
norm. Thus, since punishing people has a strong emotional component
14 people punished 
friends where one of them failed to allocate an equal share to another friend the most. As 
people easily refer to a common understanding of friendship treating someone’s friend badly 
does activate the need for punishing the most. Contrarily, people did not punish unfair 
encounters between families as often as unfair encounters between friends which might entail 
the fact that rural villages consist of many family disputes that are known to most people but 
the solution of the conflicts is private and does not concern others. Although family members 
seem to get less punished as third parties feel to interfere in private encounters they get 
equally likely punished when not exhibiting trust/altruism. Again, this underlines that player 
ones action is perceived to involve altruism and thus leads to a stronger reaction among 
kinship.  
 
Although family members exhibited more trust and more fairness among each other this is not 
due to a higher likelihood of being punished or a higher fear of norm enforcement. Indeed, 
second players who choose option “r” expected a punishment more often when they free-
rided on another friend (28,6 %) than on a family member (14,3 %). The same was true for 
first player who did not trust their friend and played “R”. 15,4 % of the participants feared a 
punishment when they did not trust their friends compared to 11,1 % of the participants who 
feared a punishment when they did not trust their family member. There seems to be an 
inherent human motivation to act altruistic towards family members whereas friendship ties 
                                                 
14 Costly punishment might itself be used to express negative emotions, recognizing that human 
demand for emotion expression can have significant behavioural consequences in social 
environments including families, (Xiao and Houser, 2008)   24
that refer to similar norms are more fragile and only combined with TPP reach similar result 
as within families. It seems that this is anticipated by people as they punish norm deviating 































Figure 7 Amount of punishment spent by third parties for deviation of trust/altruism norm. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The field experiments carried out in rural communities of Namibia and South Africa aimed at 
testing several hypotheses derived from the kin selection theory and strong reciprocity 
hypothesis. In this paper I analysed the relative strength of trust/altruism and fairness due to 
kinship and third party punishment. As some authors have argued, player one’s contributions   25
in the trust game refer to a large degree to altruism since also the predictions from kin 
selection theory seem to be appropriate for the first player.  
 
I found that people treated their family members with more trust and more fairness although 
their actions were less enforced through third parties and that was also expected by family 
members. Family members played more trusting even though they did not as often expect a 
reciprocal fair behaviour. Moreover family members exhibited more trust the closer the 
average and total relatedness of their kin in the experiment was thus the propositions from kin 
selection theory and especially Hamilton’s rule were accurate. The results for friendship were 
almost as good as for family members but it seemed that their outcome relied more on TPP 
and reciprocity than on altruism. However, a personal exchange among friends that has a third 
party observer performs better than a personal exchange among family members without third 
party punishment. Contributions to family members can substantially be increased by third 
party punishment and so human ability to sustain a norm by punishing free-riders at personal 
costs could also have played an important role in sustaining co-operation among kin. As each 
theory can explain co-operation within groups, generalizations that ignore or deny the value 
of any one model may be ambiguous. It remains a task for future empirical or theoretical 
studies to analyse the evolutionary origins of co-operation.  
 
I drew on a proposition of Madsen et al. (2007) who wrote that norms are only proxies for 
kinship (and not an independent influencing factor distinct from kinship) and humans use 
Hamilton’s rule as baseline behaviour that is coloured by other ethical considerations and that 
humans use affection, cohabitation or norms as proxies for kinship. Based on that proposition 
I derived hypotheses and tested them with the within and between subject design. It turns out 
that kinship is the baseline behaviour when no other features are available to humans and 
people refer to Hamilton’s rule of relatedness when they have the possibility. However, 
people also make use of the norm of altruistic punishment and the enforcement of that norm 
significantly changes behaviour of people who know they are paired with a family member. 
Thus, norms are a distinct factor independent from kinship and norms are also applied in 
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